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COMMENT
INTENT IN THE CRIMINAL LAW:
THE LEGAL TOWER OF BABEL
"Concrete cases or illustrations stated in the early law ... have had a tendency
to ossify into specific rules without much regard for reason."'

These words by the learned Justice Holmes concerning the rule of "retreat
to the wall" are essentially applicable to innumerable other areas of the law, both
civil and criminal. Under our system, the law has a definite tendency to become
stagnant because of the principle of stare decisis and because of the inclination of
both courts and lawyers to fit new concepts and theories into accepted legal molds
and phraseology. Such a procedure inevitably means the growth of the content
of a word while the word itself remains the same, so that a legal word of art
arises, intelligible, if at all, only in reference to a mass of case law and juristic
explication. Such a situation, like the ossification of a legal concept, is most
detrimental to the growth of the law in accord with reason. Courts and lawyers
begin to think in terms of the word of art rather than the basic principles which
gave birth to the necessity for the use of the word at all.
This paper is concerned with a legal word of art, "intent," as it is used and
understood in criminal law. It proposes to set forth the concept of intent as
utilized in the positive law of crimes and the confusion which surrounds this
concept, along with a short historical summary of the development of the criminal
law and the idea of intent as it plays a part in that development. Secondly, this
article proposes to delineate part of the relationship between moral-religious
law and the criminal law as they interpret the basic elements of individual responsibility, and, also, to set forth the writer's opinion as to what the legal foundation for criminal liability should be. Finally, this paper will touch lightly on
certain types of statutory crimes which in the light of the principles to be discussed seem to the writer to be a clear perversion of the criminal law.
The Concept and Growth of Criminal Intent
Speaking generally, there are three types of legal intent. Specific intent is a
requirement of some crimes, usually those derived from the common law, and it
is said that specific intent calls for actual knowledge of the law and the wrongful
intent to do the prohibited act.2 In reference to a crime, this would seem to mean
that specific intent is the wilful commission of an act known to be forbidden by
the criminal law. General intent, on the other hand, is commonly deemed to be
that type of intent which may be drawn from the commission of the act itself. For
I Holmes, J., in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
*Hargrove v. United States, 67 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1933).
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example, in a case of involuntary manslaughter, the requisite general intent may
be inferred from the negligence of the accused. 8
The third type of intent pertinent to criminal law is constructive or transferred intent. The doctrine has received little judicial support,' probably because
of the broad scope given to general intent, and we are not presently concerned
with it.
The above statements in regard to intent, general and specific, seem relatively clear and cohesive. Yet, in reference to the growth of criminal law and
the case law which interprets the concept of intent, the notions of intent become
clouded and vague. Perhaps some concrete examples will serve to illustrate just
how amorphous is the concept of intent.
Generally, assault is deemed to require a specific intent, the intent to do
violence. This is fairly obvious since assault is really an unlawful attempt, and
criminal attempt is universally held to require a specific intent. Yet even a cursory
glance at the case law will show that while courts may demand specific intent
in an assault case, they will frequently settle for general intent, i.e., the intent will
be inferred from the act itself.8 Another view in assault cases is that specific intent
cannot be inferred from the fact of assault alone, but that it can be drawn from
the whole circumstances of the case.6 Yet every act has surrounding circumstances, so that even here specific intent is essentially being drawn from the
act itself. Some courts have drawn the specific intent from an unlawful act with
foreseeable consequences.7 All this occurs in the face of the judicial thought that
the guilty intent must be proved, that it cannot be inferred."
Thus, although the concepts of specific and general intent and their distinctions seem well defined and of some substance, the case law shows how closely
the two concepts blend with one another. In essence, the net result is that the
two concepts merge so that all the particular meaning of specific intent is
destroyed. Both are drawn from the act itself, or from the surrounding circumstances which is practically the same thing. The only difference seems to be the
order of proof. It is generally conceived that the state has the burden of proving
3Rex v. Bateman, 19 Cr. App. R. 8 (1925). Just how much negligence is required
is a matter of disagreement. Compare Rex v. Bateman, supra, with Fitzgerald v. State, 112
Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895). Here, again, is an interesting bit of legal jargon. The requisite
negligence has been judicially described as gross, criminal, wanton, or reckless. Yet, whichever
word is chosen makes little substantial difference except in jury instructions.
4State v. Martin, 342 Mo. 1089, 119 S.W. 2d 298 (1938).
5 State v. Lankford, 6 Boyce 594, 102 Atd. 63 (1917); People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666,
30 Pac. 800 (1892).
' Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896).
7 State v. Schutte, 87 N.J.L. 15, 93 Atd. 112 (1915).
8 Rex v. Steane, 1 All E.R. 813 (1947). The courts have even gone so far as to say
that specific intent can be drawn from a conditional threat. People v. Connors et al., 253
I11.266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912). Contra, Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689, 28 Am. Rep. 392
(1877).
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specific intent in the first instance, while in the case of general intent the state
need only show the act from which the intent will be presumed. As we have seen,
in the present state of the law, this rule means little in actual practice.
We are, then, in an area where the courts say one thing but frequently mean
another. Such a process inevitably leads to judicial confusion. It is suggested that
Commonwealth v. HawkinsO presents such a situation. The case concerned a
charge of assault with a deadly weapon. As has been pointed out, such a charge
would normally demand a specific intent. However, the court stated in part:
"It is the general rule in criminal proceedings at common law that a defendant
cannot be convicted unless a criminal intent is shown, but it is not necessary
that he should have intended the particular wrong which resulted from his
0

act.'

Thus, the court calls for general rather than specific intent, and it then goes on
to justify such action by reference to a situation of transferred intent.
"It is a familiar rule that one who shoots intending to hit A., and accidentally
hits and injures B., is liable for an assault and battery on B. So, in cases of
homicide, the rule is well established, that one who wantonly, or in a reckless
or grossly negligent manner, does that which results in the death of a human
being, is guilty of manslaughter, although he did not contemplate such a result.
: * . There has been much discussion in the cases in regard to the nature of
intent necessary to constitute this crime, but the better opinion is that nothing
more is required than an intentional doing of an act which, by reason of its
wanton or grossly negligent character, exposes another to personal injury, and
causes such injury.u"

This is not meant to intimate that this decision as to final result was
erroneous, and, after all, it is the result of litigation with which judicial administration is primarily concerned. If judicial confusion and linguistic inaccuracies
were all that were involved, and if the ultimate determination of the particular
case were always acceptable, there could be no valid criticism. However, legal
fictions and linguistic inaccuracies have a grave tendency to end in unreasoning
injustice. They mold the legal mind to think in terms of fictions and words of art
without regard to elemental concepts and basic principles of justice. It is such
a result as this which has occurred through the utilization of the word intent, as
that word has come to be used in criminal law.
It may be well at this point to sketch rather briefly the development of
criminal law in reference to the growth of the legal concept of intent to demonstrate fully what the writer believes is a clearly unreasonable and unjust result
as a consequence of legal confusion over the real meaning of intent. While it
9 157 Mass. 551, 32 N.E. 862 (1893).
10 Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 157 Mass. 551, 553, 32 N.E. 862, 863 (1893).
" Id. at 553, 32 N.E. at 863.
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has been said that "it is useless to go into the developments of the law from the
time when a man who had killed another no matter how innocently had to get
his pardon," 12 it is also true that an idea of the growth of the law is helpful in
comprehending a rule of law and in evaluating a trend in the law.
It appears in primitive times that criminal or penal law was wholly objective.
Both moral culpability and individualization in regard to the accused were lacking.
There was no concept that a guilty mind was an element of the transgression of
the social law, and punishment followed regardless of moral guilt."' The act
itself was the primary object of censure. However, by the time that the common
law had developed in England, great advances in legal theory had been made. It
was conceived that an act and an evil intent must combine in order to constitute
a crime.14 Thus, it has been thought that at common law knowledge and an evil
intent were requisites of all crimes."' So it appears at common law that evil
intent was deemed to be an essential element in criminal liability, and it was in
the common law that the doctrine of specific intent had its real inception.
As society developed and civilization became more complex, the courts and
legislatures began to back away from the concept of specific intent and the
philosophy that lay behind it. As a consequence of this procedure, the ideas of
specific and general intent became merged so that specific intent lost almost all of
its distinctive characteristics. This has been mentioned in reference to the crime
of assault as it is understood in its modern legal setting.
The development was natural. It is obvious that a person's intent can never
be objectively demonstrated; at best, a person's subjective intent can only be
drawn from an objective act. Since this is true, the courts finally faced the obvious
either by demanding only general intent, i.e., intent as drawn from the act itself,
or blended the concepts of general and specific intent so as to make the latter
largely meaningless. Actually, it seems to make little difference which word
or group of words is chosen so long as they correctly reflect that quality of a
person which is a proper basis for criminal liability, and so long as the words and
the proper basis for criminal liability are accurately understood by courts, lawyers,
and legislatures.
At the same time, however, there was a far more invidious trend in legal
thought. The concept of individual punishment as a result of a guilty mind
which had taken so long to develop began to lose ground. Society became molded
and systematized, and its governing law also inclined to crystallize into fixed patterns and rules. The important aspect of criminal liability was no longer a guilty
12Holmes, J., in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
1s See SALEILLES, The Individualization of Punishment, MODERN CRIMINAL SaENCE
SERIES 21-34 (1911).
14 1 BISHOP, THE CRIMINAL LAW 113, 263 (8th ed. 1892).
15State v. Dombroski, 145 Minn. 278, 176 N.W. 985 (1920).
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mind; rather, the important aspect of a crime became the very commission of
an act forbidden by the positive law of a particular jurisdiction. The act and its
consequences became the focal point. The idea of intent was retained generally
as a necessary element in a crime, 6 as a vestigial remnant of the older legal
theory, but since general intent may be drawn from the act itself it is fairly correct to say that the act itself and its consequences are of primary import in present
criminal law.
This new emphasis in criminal law has given rise to a wholly new type of
crime, the statutory crime. Such a result was preordained by the confusion surrounding the idea of intent and the development of the sociological and pragmatic
view of law. By a statutory crime, I refer to that type of act declared to be
criminal without reference to intent. By judicial interpretation, this has come to
mean criminal liability without reference to whether the act is known to be
definitely wrong and frequently without reference to whether the person even
knows that he is doing the act. No intent, even as understood by the law, is
required; the act itself is the thing to be punished. There are numerous illustrations of such laws, e.g., the sale of securities without a license,", or the automobile
rifling statutes."8 The latter normally makes mere possession of an automobile
whose engine numbers have been rifled a criminal offense. With the law in this
posture, a person may be liable for the act of another without even knowledge
that the act has been done.'
Nor is the principle behind the statutory crime, i.e., the act itself is to be pun.
ished regardless of intent, limited to statutory crimes per se. The basic principle
has been extended so as to include a field of vicarious criminal liability. Thus
it has been said that a corporation may be guilty of larceny, a crime requiring
specific intent, since the requisite criminal intent may be imputed to it through
20
the acts of its agents.
To recapitulate for a moment, we see a natural and seemingly logical growth
and refinement of criminal law. At first, the act itself is punished regardless of
intent. Then intent becomes the primary element of criminal liability, the
menm rea is considered the factor which makes a person deserving of criminal
punishment. Subsequently, the courts and legislatures begin to chop away at the
idea of specific intent and to place greater emphasis upon the act and its consequences as the foundation upon which to lay criminal responsibility. Finally, we
"ISee,

for example, Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. Rep. 338, 176 Pac. 771 (1918).

17 People v. Flumerfelt, 35 Cal. App. 2d 495, 96 P. 2d 190 (1939).

18 People v. Fernow, 286 111. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919).
19 Statutory crimes are not limited to individuals. The idea has been extended to corporations. In United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., Inc., 163 F. 2d 10008 (7th Cir.
1947), a corporation was held liable for the unauthorized act of an agent of which it

had no knowledge.
20 People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corp., 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).
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reach the ultimate sociological-pragmatic position where the courts and legislatures follow this development to its logical conclusion by placing total emphasis
upon the act and its consequences regardless of intent.
This, then, is the growth of criminal law and theory, a growth on which
commentators frequently dote as demonstrating the flexibility of the common law
system. The present writer, however, regards this development as a growth of
the law without regard to reason or common sense, as a retrogression of the law
rather than an advancement. While it represents a development which is quite
logical, this is logic carried to the point of absurdity and ultimate injustice. To
speak of intent on the part of a corporation is to invade the wonderland of
Alice; 21 to punish men as criminals without regard to mental action is unjust and
shocking. This is, indeed, growth of the law, but it is a law growing in an unintelligible and unreasonable manner.
When law becomes unreasonable and incomprehensible, and results in unjust
consequences, it is time to re-evaluate the rules and premises on which the law
is founded. It becomes essential to return to fundamental and elemental principles
on the nature of man and society, and the interrelationships between the two, in
order to achieve a comprehensive, harmonious, just, and effective system of criminal
law.
Common Sense Concerning Criminal Law
It is the writer's belief that criminal law can learn a great deal from moral
law. We are a Christian, ethical people, with our religious and moral roots sunk
deeply in the Christian philosophy of man and society. The common law, particularly that of crimes, developed in this philosophy and theology, and it can
be broadly said that our present system of criminal law is but a judicial and legislative refinement of common law principles. It would seem quite natural, then,
that there should be a great many similarities between moral law and positive
criminal law, at least in their basic elements.
However, for a good many years, there has been a definite judicial inclination
to completely divorce moral law and positive criminal law. Thus, one writer, in
speaking of federal criminal law where the common law has not been adopted,
has felt that the basis for criminal responsibility is the consequence of the act
upon the public, and that moral fault is not a necessary element of a crime except
as it may be involved in the very fact of violation of the law.12 Judicial statements
are frequently to the same general effect. It has been said that the criminal law
21 "'But
"glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument,"' 'Alice objected.
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what
I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'" So also with the "intent" of a corporation.
"Intent" as used by this court apparently means, "the agents of the corporation did this and
the corporation ought to pay."
22 See MAY, LAW OF CRIMES 16 (4th ed., Sears & Weihofen 1938).
This analysis
disregards the construction of statutory law in the light of common law precepts and ideas.
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aims at preventing certain acts and results not at punishing sins, 23 and that crimi24
nal law frequently does not punish acts which are morally wrong.
It cannot be successfully denied that moral law and criminal law have different
objectives in part, nor that there is a grave distinction between a crime and a moral
wrong. To say that moral law and criminal law are not synonymous is quite correct; to follow the same line of reasoning in order to put the moral law and the
criminal law in conflict as to the ultimate basis for responsibility is quite another
thing. There is a distinction in the type of act prohibited by moral and criminal
law, and a difference in the result to be attained, but there should be no conflict
as to the foundation of liability. This is apparent from a consideration of the
two types of law.
Moral law is founded on the principle that every thing should and must
act in accord with its own peculiar nature. Man, a creature of intellect and free
will, must freely act in a rational or reasonable manner. Moral law is, in our
society, buttressed by certain religious precepts which set forth certain acts contrary to man's nature, e.g., murder, adultery, theft, etc. The moral-religious order
presents the ideal basis for a system of law. It presupposes an omnipotent and
omniscient God, and an individual conscience which informs man of right and
wrong in each particular factual situation. Under this system, with its prerequisites
of God and conscience, a man commits a moral wrong only when he knowingly
and wilfully does an act which he knows to be wrong or should know to be
wrong except for culpable ignorance. Under the moral law, we are almost entirely
preoccupied with the mental state of the actor. It really matters not what the act
itself was or what its consequences were, for moral law is concerned with intellectual fault and not objective result. The requisites of moral wrong are a certain
knowledge, a free will, and the commission of an act known to be wrong, with
total emphasis on knowledge and will rather than on the act itself.
Positive criminal law, on the other hand, is, and should be, first concerned
with the act and secondarily with the mind of the actor. This is necessarily so,
since the jury in the positive legal system stands in the relationship of God to
the moral system, and the only way for the jury to reach the subjective mental
state of a person is through an inference drawn from an objective act. This is
not to say that positive criminal law is wholly, or even primarily, concerned with
the act itself. It is, or should be, concerned with the act as it shows a reprehensible
mental state on the part of the actor. Barring statutory crimes, this can generally
be said to be the law, since a crime as defined normally includes an act plus some
kind of intent.
23 Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897).
24

People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
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The essential elements of a crime, therefore, appear to be some kind of
intent and an illegal act. Intent, however, in essence means a certain knowledge
2
and will on the part of the actor. This is apparent from several considerations.
In the first place, criminal law is generally applied only to human beings, excepting
of course later application to business entities through a wholly fictitious use of
the word intent. That is to say, usually criminal law is applied only to creatures
with the knowledge and will. The primitive concept of punishment of animals
as responsible for their acts is abhorrent and even amusing to the modern mind.
Secondly, that the real basis of criminal liability is a certain knowledge and
will is shown by the theories on criminal punishment. Criminal punishment consists primarily of either public disgrace or personal harm. It involves either a
fine, which is in no way distinguishable from tort damages except in measure
and in the idea of public censure, or it involves incarceration or death. The
purpose of criminal punishment has been variously urged as punitive, preventive,
reformative, or for public vindication. The modern trend seems to favor the preventive or reformative purposes, in the utilitarian view of criminal punishment.
One writer in stressing this view has gone so far as to state that punishing a
person for involuntary or unintentional acts is stupid, since he cannot possibly
be improved by punishment in such a case.28 Here, again, in the field of criminal
punishment, we find an emphasis on the voluntary and intentional (knowing
and wilful) quality of an act.
Finally, and most conclusively, that the basis of criminal responsibility is a
certain knowledge and will is demonstrated by the various defenses open in most
criminal prosecutions. Facts which show either lack of knowledge or lack of will
normally constitute defenses to the charge of crime. For example, while it is said
that ignorance of the law is no defense,21 ignorance of the facts from which a
2
wrongful intent can be drawn may be a defense. 1 So, also, where specific intent
29
is required, severe drunkenness may be a defense. The defense of insanity also
stresses lack of knowledge as an answer to a crime, at least as far as that defense
25 Perhaps the greatest legal analyst to sit on the Supreme Court bench has recognized
knowledge as the basic element of legal responsibility. He wrote, "as a last step, foresight
was reduced to its lowest term, and it was concluded that, subject to exceptions which were
explained, the general basis of criminal liability was knowledge, at the time of action, of
facts from which common experience showed that certain harmful results were likely to

follow." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 130, 131 (1881).
28 See WOOD, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. L. 630-640 (1938).
"7 It should be remembered that the doctrine that ignorance of the law is no defense is
subject to some exceptions. In administrative cases, mistake of law may be a defense, i.e.,
where an agency interpretation of the law is relied upon. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal.
App. 41, 24 P. 2d 965 (1933). In reality, this seems to make knowledge of the law and
intent to obey it a valid defense. Perhaps this should be the rule in all cases.
28United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Philippine 488 (1910); Gordon v. State, 52 Ala.

23 Am.Rep. 575 (1875).
308, 29
State v. Byers, 136 Wash. 620, 241 Pac. 9 (1925).

19591

COMMENT

is set out in the M'Naghten test of right and wrong. 0 The right and wrong
test, clothed in modern garb, is still almost universally accepted. As for lack of
will as a defense, the obvious answer is duress,31 which essentially means a lack
of will to commit the act. Another defense based on lack of will is insanity by
reason of irresistible impulse, acceptable in several jurisdictions throughout the
United States. 2
An outstanding exposition of the latter defense which also emphasizes knowledge and will as the basis of criminal responsibility is contained in Parsons v.
State.3 Whether or not one agrees with the psychiatric premise behind the
defense of irresistible impulse, the theory of the court in regard to the problem
of criminal responsibility presents a rational and even ideal approach. The court
said in part:
"No one can deny that there must be two constituent elements of legal responsibility in the commission of every crime, and no rule can be just and reasonable which fails to recognize either of them: (1) Capacity of intellectual
discrimination;and (2) Freedom of will .. . (Emphasis added).
If therefore, it be true, as a matter of fact, that the disease of insanity
can, in its action on the human brain through a shattered nervous organization,
or in any other mode, so affect the mind as to subvert the freedom of the will,
and thereby destroy the power of the victim to choose between the right and
wrong although he perceive it-by which we mean the power of volition to
adhere in action to the right and abstain from the wrong-is such a one criminally responsible for an act done under the influence of such controlling
disease: We clearly think not, and such, we believe to be the just, reasonable,
and humane rule, towards which all the modern authorities in this country,
legislation in England, and the laws of other civilized countries of the world,
are gradually, but surely tending .. .34"

Whatever may be the trend as to irresistible impulse, we can only wish that the
same rational approach and common sense trend were present in all areas of criminal law as to the foundation for criminal liability. However, the prevalence of
statutory crimes shows that the current inclination is clearly away from knowledge
and will as forming such a basis.
Nonetheless, if it be correct that knowledge and will are the proper foundation on which to lay criminal responsibility, then there is no conflict between
moral and criminal law. To sum up what has been said, the basis of moral
responsibility is knowledge, will, and a known wrongful act; the basis of criminal
responsibility is intent and an illegal act. But intent, as shown by theory and
80 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200 (1843).
81See Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925).
32 One state, New Hampshire, refuses to accept either the right and wrong test or the
test of irresistible impulse. There the rule is that a jury question is presented in each case
as to whether the alleged mental disease was such as to take away the capacity to form the
requisite criminal intent. See WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
15-16 (1933).
33
3 4 81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193 (1886).
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 585, 586, 60 Am. Rep. 193, 198-199 (1886).
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case law, properly connotes knowledge and will. Hence, a crime, properly understood, really involves a certain knowledge, will, and an illegal act. In the last
analysis, then, it appears that the distinction between a moral wrong and a legalistic crime is the type of knowledge and will demanded and the type of act prohibited. Both, however, require or should require some type of knowledge and
will as the basis for responsibility.
This is quite natural and fitting, since the moral system presents the perfect,
utopian idea as compared with the imperfect positive law system. As has been
pointed out, the moral law, concerned only with individual guilt rather than
consequences of acts, lays stress on the mind of the actor in that the act must be
known to be wrong. Criminal law, on the other hand, is, in the nature of things,
concerned in the first instance with the objective, manifested act both because
of its effect on an ordered society and as indicative of the mental state of the
actor. Thus, the different functions of moral and criminal law result in a different
emphasis in the two systems of law. Criminal law has variously laid primary or
total stress upon either the act, the result, the intent of the actor, or, most frequently, on a combination of act and intent. This divergent stress is present in
both legal theory and decisional law. For example, criminal attempt no doubt
stresses the intent element " since punishment follows regardless of the consummation of the act, while involuntary manslaughter tends to emphasize the act
and its consequences regardless of actual intent, as do all crimes which require only
general intent.
This is not a condemnation of the positive criminal law system. The system
no doubt suffers from inherent defects which inevitably flow from an imperfect
human nature and society. The fact of inherent imperfections in the law should
not, however, prevent us from at least striving for the rational ideal. The writer
believes that the rational ideal represents a stress upon a combination of act
and intent as essential elements of all crimes. Total reliance on the intent
is erroneous because intent can only be drawn from an act; total stress on
the result is manifestly wrong or all killing would be murder; and total emphasis
on the act is obviously unjust, since all acts are in themselves indifferent. The only
rational and just solution is an emphasis on a combination of act and intent. This,
of course, presupposes a reasonable interpretation of what intent should actually
signify, i.e., at least knowledge on the part of the actor that he is acting and a
wilful commission of the act.
Statutory Crimes
The statements made above bring us to a short consideration of statutory
crimes where the retreat from the concept of knowledge and will as the basis
85 All that is required is specific intent and an overt act toward consummation. People
v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d 527, 42 P. 2d 308 (1935).
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for criminal responsibility is particularly manifest. No doubt legislatures have
limited ability to decide which acts are so detrimental to social welfare as to
deserve criminal sanctions; and no doubt public welfare and an ordered society
demand that every person must be deemed to know the law. However, these
principles plus the idea of general intent constitute the full eiltent to which any
reasonable law should go. With these principles set solidly in the positive criminal
law, all that is required for criminal responsibility is the knowing and wilful
commission of an act forbidden by the positive criminal law, regardless of
whether the actor knows that the act is forbidden and regardless of the morality
of the act. Certainly no reasonable law should settle for less than these few
requirements.
Statutory crimes often go further than these limits. These crimes are of
two sorts: statutory crimes which punish the doing of an affirmative act, where
the act, at least, must be knowingly and wilfully done, or which punish the wilful
omission of a required act, e.g., the sale of securities without a license, or the
wilful failure to file a tax return; and statutory crimes which may reach to the
unknowing and involuntary acts of a wholly innocent party, e.g., the rifling
statutes. If we are correct in supposing that the rational basis of criminal liability
is knowledge and will, statutory crimes which may have the latter effect are clearly
unjust. While it is said that public welfare justifies any private injustice which
may result, it is to be wondered whether there is any public benefit in the possibility
of criminally punishing a person's unconscious and involuntary acts and whether
society even has the right to subjugate individual rights to public welfare to this
extent.
Somewhat the same considerations apply in the case of vicarious criminal
responsibility such as the imputation of intent to a business entity through the
acts of its agents. If it is unsatisfactory to speak of intent on the part of a corporation, it is positively absurd to speak of knowledge and will on the part of a
corporation. No doubt the detrimental acts of corporate agents should be punished,
and, perhaps, the corporation and its stockholders should be made to carry some
financial burden because of these acts, but is the application of criminal law to
the corporation through a wholly fictitious use of criminal intent the answer in this
area? The writer thinks not. Public welfare can be adequately protected by tort
laws in the area of absolute liability, by the injunctive process, by dissolution in
appropriate cases, or by other specific sanctions directed at corporations which make
it unprofitable and inconvenient for them to carry on the prohibited acts. There
is no need or excuse for introducing another confusing accretion onto the already
vague concept of intent.
It must be admitted that statutory crimes have generally been upheld, but,
at times, they have met strong judicial opposition on the basis of state constitu-
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tionss or the federal Constitution."' It is to be fervently hoped that the recent
United States Supreme Court case, Lambert v. People,"' is but the prelude to a
concerted assault on statutory crimes, for this invidious trend in modern law carries with it the grave inclination to sacrifice private rights upon the high altar of
statism. The author regards this trend as a clear retrogression of the criminal law
to primitive principles of animal punishment and punishment based on the act
itself regardless of the guilt of the actor.
Conclurion
We started this discussion with a statement from one of the great jurists
America has produced. It is fitting that we close with a quotation from the same
justice.
"The law has grown, and even ifhistorical mistakes have contributed to its
39
growth it has tended in the direction of rules consistent with human nature.

This paper has tried to demonstrate that the confusion surrounding the word
"intent" has led to grave errors in the criminal law and that the real basis of
criminal responsibility is, or should be, a certain type of knowledge and will in all
cases. Intent has become such a vague concept that semantics rather than basic
principles have come to govern the criminal law. A trend once started is difficult
to reverse. But if the law is to grow in accord with human nature and reason, the
retrogression in criminal law toward injustice and incomprehensibility must be
halted. Intent must be understood for what it is-knowledge and will-and these
elements must be made basic requirements for criminal responsibility in every
case, so that criminal law can be molded into a just and harmonious whole.
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s See State v. Park, 42 Nev. 386, 178 Pac. 389 (1919). Here a statutory crime was
struck down on the theory of "intolerable inconvenience," i.e., the police power of the
state was overreached since public benefit was exceeded by public inconvenience.
s7Lambert v. People, 78 Sup. Ct. 240 (U.S. 1958).
88Ibid. Here, a California felon registration law was struck down as a violation of due
process in that it punished the omission of an act, without intent, i.e., without knowledge
of the law. The case has been bitterly criticized as an invalid interference in state matters,
as are all decisions of the Supreme Court by those who consider themselves adversely
affected. It must be admitted that the decision is in utter conflict with established principles
of criminal law in that it seems to make ignorance of the law a defense in certain types of
crimes. Nevertheless, the justice and good sense of the decision is obvious. Just how far it
will serve as a precedent for an attack on statutory crimes is doubtful, since the Court was
careful to limit the decision to statutory crimes of omission. It should be added, however,
that the difference beween the unknowing omission of an act and the unknowing commission
of an act is too subtle to support a distinction.
89 Holmes, J., in Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).

